The AAISM is ISACA’s Advanced in AI Security Management credential, and new is the word that explains most of what follows. New exam, new training materials, new subject matter that is changing faster than any of them can keep up with. I passed it in July 2026. The credential is worth holding and the training was worth buying – but all of it still has the rough edges of a first edition, and the honest way to review it is as one.
The card is a clone. Its PCI vendor ID is 0x8888 – not a registered vendor, just four eights, the fingerprint of hardware built to look like something it isn’t. lspci calls it a “Silicon Magic AVMatrix VC12 4K HDMI Capture.” It’s a cheap 4K HDMI capture card in the lineage of a Magewell Pro Capture, and it had sat dead in one of my machines since I bought it, because the only Linux driver I could find for it didn’t work.
Running a local LLM server is the easy part. Getting three separate pieces of infrastructure to agree that a model is downloaded, reachable, and worth waiting for is where the afternoon goes. Over the past two weeks I shipped three fixes across two open-source projects to get AMD’s Lemonade serving models behind the Olla proxy on my Strix Halo box. None of them was hard in the algorithmic sense – the diffs are a struct field, a config key, and a prepended path. They all came out of the same goal: point Olla at Lemonade on a Radeon and get a chat completion back.
Reviews and notes on useful software tools.
Every unit test was green. The page returned 502 anyway.
The route was a treasure generator. Its store had a thorough test suite, all passing, because the test built the store the way the test knew to build it – with the database pool wired in. Production built it differently: a copy-paste in the route setup left the pool out, the store carried a nil handle, and the first query dereferenced nil. The handler panicked, the connection dropped, the reverse proxy turned that into a 502. No test caught it, because no test exercised the wired route against a running server. The tests checked the parts. Nothing checked that the assembled thing served.
A few weeks ago I wrote that defense in depth for AI agents means layers, not walls: screen untrusted content before the model acts on it, sanitize what comes back out, and never trust the data flowing through. Clean theory. Then I went back and read the code in Herald that was supposed to implement those layers.
Several of them didn’t hold.
Herald is my feed reader. It pulls RSS and Atom from across the internet, runs each article through a local security model before anything else touches it, scores the survivors for relevance, and announces the interesting ones. Every feed item is untrusted content aimed at a model. That’s the whole premise of the defense-in-depth piece, and it’s exactly the threat I built Herald to study. What follows is the v0.2.0 hardening pass – the bugs the theory missed, and a couple of ideas that worked.
On March 24, 2026, the LiteLLM PyPI package was compromised. Versions 1.82.7 and 1.82.8, published by an account labeled TeamPCP, contained malicious code. I had LiteLLM running in my homelab as a routing layer between local AI clients and several model backends. This post is the postmortem: what I was running, what the exposure actually was, why I removed LiteLLM rather than just upgrading, and what the incident clarified about supply chain risk in homelab AI infrastructure.
The security conversation around AI agents has mostly focused on two things: keeping agents from hurting the host system, and keeping malicious tools out of the supply chain. These are real problems. Cisco documented how OpenClaw leaks credentials and executes arbitrary shell commands. Projects like NanoClaw respond by running agents in containers where bash commands can’t reach the host. Zencoder’s MCP survival guide catalogs supply chain attacks against MCP servers and recommends pinning git tags and auditing source.
Persistent memory for AI agents solves a real problem (the goldfish-with-a-PhD problem) but it introduces a new one: a high-trust, cross-session, cross-agent data store sitting inside the LLM’s context loop. Every recall is content that flows into a prompt. Every store is content that came from somewhere – sometimes the user, sometimes the model, sometimes a tool result that originated externally.
That’s a threat model worth writing down before the data store grows up. This post is the threat model for memstore – the persistent memory system I built for Claude Code – and the controls I’m applying or planning.